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Abstract 
 Understanding the relationship between alien rights and citizen rights 
is critical in an era of globalization and migration. State efforts to effectively 
manage asylum have repeatedly been frustrated by its commitments to 
international human rights regimes, such as the European Court of Human 
Rights. Over time, this tribunal has established an effective linkage between 
the human rights obligations of liberal democracies and their duties towards 
asylum seekers within their territory. This eventuation has led to the 
formation of the so called liberal paradox of asylum, reflected in the 
seemingly contradictory asylum policies of states. In one respect, the 
government is adopting schemes to deter and penalize migrants, while 
contrastingly it is embedding human rights, which provide asylum seekers 
with means to challenge the decision to expel them. This article explores and 
analyses this apparent contradiction, where increasingly restrictive measures 
seem to be developing side by side with growing human-rights-oriented 
inclusive legal practices.  
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Understanding the relationship between alien rights and citizen rights 
is critical in an era of globalisation and migration. In 1992 the then British 
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd claimed that he and his European 
counterparts deemed migration “among all the other problems we face – the 
most crucial” [8, 153]. As liberal democracies moved closer to the end of the 
twentieth century, the issue of asylum has become increasingly important 
and problematic. With a constant flux of jet age asylum seekers it became 
more and more difficult for state authorities to maintain a grip on the volume 
and character of forced migration. State efforts to effectively manage asylum 
have repeatedly been frustrated by its commitments to international human 
rights regimes, such as the European Court of Human Rights. Over time, this 
tribunal has established an effective linkage between the human rights 
obligations of liberal democracies and their duties towards asylum seekers 
within their territory. This legal linkage has served to provide procedural 
outlets for rejected asylum seekers, limiting the capacity of the state to 
deport them.  
This eventuation has led to the formation of the so called liberal 
paradox of asylum, reflected in the seemingly contradictory asylum policies 
of states. In one respect, the government is adopting schemes to deter and 
penalise migrants, while contrastingly it is embedding human rights, which 
provide asylum seekers with means to challenge the decision to expel them 
through domestic and international courts. Thus, increasingly restrictive 
measures seem to be developing side by side with growing inclusive legal 
practices. The existence of such circumstances begs the question: “Why 
would any government commit itself to a human rights regime, the sole 
purpose of which is to constrain its domestic sovereignty over asylum 
matters?”   
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The liberal paradox warrants scrutiny for numerous reasons. The 
widespread supposition that there is an inherent paradox within asylum 
policies of liberal democracies affects the way governments view the 
relationship between citizen rights and alien (non-citizen) rights. The elected 
authorities are accountable to their voters and derive their popularity from 
the promotion of citizens’ interests; asylum seekers are perceived as negative 
agents by the residents and therefore have become undesirable for states. 
Looking through an optic of a liberal paradox, citizen and alien rights are 
juxtaposed against each other in an exclusive way, so the government can 
only expand one body of rights and not both. Thus the authorities presume 
that the relationship between the interests of these groups is defined in terms 
of a zero-sum game and consequently act in accordance with that 
presumption.  
The outcome is increasingly restrictive, deterring and penalising 
legislation, which aims to satisfy the requests of citizens through the 
violation of migrants’ human rights. Further, the liberal paradox conceals the 
wider contexts within which asylum seekers are located; the webs of legal 
constraints that surround alien rights; and the actual policy choices presented 
to national decision makers. The implications of weakening the liberal 
paradox would be the demythologisation of state’s absolute sovereignty over 
asylum matters and a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between citizen 
and alien rights. The theoretical possibility of a more inclusive, flexible and 
consistent approach to asylum would uncover the prospect of a mutually-
complementary existence, pointing to the necessity of international 
solidarity, mutual co-operation and burden sharing.  
Exercise of political sovereignty is the assertion of citizen rights 
through democracy. As a member of an international system the state must 
institute a judicial standard, which separates nationals from non-nationals. In 
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a liberal democracy that standard is citizenship: from a legal perspective it 
represents “the capacity of a national to participate in the nation decision-
making” [3, 2]. This participation in statehood acquires meaning through the 
exercise of political sovereignty where citizens have the right to choose all 
other members of the polity. The scope and extent of this right has become 
subject to much debate as states are relying on their sovereign prerogatives to 
violate alien’s human rights, through the so called “politics of restriction.”  
There have been a number of theories regarding the origins of politics 
of restriction in liberal democracies. The causes of this phenomenon have 
been attributed to: (1) the rise in asylum applications; (2) the character of the 
elites and party ideologies; (3) the end of the Cold War and the loss of 
refugee’s geopolitical value [1, 350). However, all of these fail to persuade 
as they tend to focus on the effects rather than the causes, overlook political 
developments or exercise a historically selective approach [4, 3-5]. The most 
convincing theory, put forward by Gibney, is that of ‘democratisation of 
asylum’. It holds that the West has experienced a shift of decision power 
from state discretion and High politics (matters of national security) to the 
populace and Low politics (matters of day to day electoral politics), where 
political popularity became contingent on public opinion. The demos had 
called for increasingly greater restriction of borders and the authorities could 
no longer ignore this discontent [4, 17]. The origins of such attitudes have 
been traced to certain xenophobic feelings, lack of refugee representation; 
social, religious and economic animosity, driven by the perception of 
overforeignisation
 
[11].  
The UK brings this development into sharp focus: “British 
immigration policy has never known an active phase of recruitment; it has 
been from the start a negative control policy to keep immigrants out” [7, 
288]. Even during the period of refugee acceptance, designed as a vehicle for 
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ideological triumph over the communist states, the process was static and the 
public remained sceptical [2, 105]. The demos views the state as something 
that exists to advance their interests as individuals and citizens in contrast to 
those of aliens. Thus, the process of democratisation of asylum has led to the 
assertion of citizen rights through democratic channels and an advancement 
towards a would-be zero immigration country. This assertion of political 
sovereignty represents the first half of the politics of restriction.  
The second half of politics of restriction is the concept of legal 
sovereignty, which, in this context, refers to a state’s absolute right to 
exclude all aliens if it so wishes. This proposition originates from the judicial 
opinions of the 1891 precedent-setting case of Musgrove13; the interpretation 
of international law theorists [15] and consequent domestic legal thought 
[10]. Additionally, post-9/11 security considerations have served to amplify 
refugee-related anxieties and forced the concept of sovereignty pertaining to 
the question of alien admission, back into the discourse of statecraft. The 
exercise of this concept of sovereignty (legal) constitutes the second half of 
restrictive asylum strategy. Taken together, political and legal sovereignty 
comprise the first element of the liberal paradox of asylum: politics of 
restriction.  
The second element of the paradox is the “law of inclusion”, which 
refers to the expanding levels of protection being granted to asylum seekers 
within the jurisdiction of liberal democracies. The process of progressive 
embedding of human rights has led to the formation of an effective 
connection of human rights with refugee law; due to this connection aliens 
have acquired a package of entitlements beyond the powers of the state. 
Article 1(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 
                                                          
13 Musgrove v Chun Teeong Toy, Privy Council (Australia) 18 March 1891 
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Convention) defines a refugee as someone who “owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group of political opinion, is outside his 
country of origin and is unable or [...] unwilling to return to it”14. Taken in 
conjunction with the Declaration on Territorial Asylum (DTA), which holds 
that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution”15 and Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUC), which reinforces the right to seek asylum, it guarantees aliens the 
right to seek asylum. However, it does not challenge any signatory state’s 
discretionary right to grant asylum, thus under international law it remains an 
optional right of each state to grant or refuse asylum [9]. The only obligation 
expressed in the 1951 Convention is under Article 33, which expressly 
forbids states to return (refouler) an asylum-seeker to a territory where they 
may face persecution, subject to certain specified conditions.16
 
Articles 3 of 
the DTA, 19 of the EUC and 3 of the Convention Against Torture (CAT)17
 
have reinforced and extended this right, making refugee law “the unwanted 
child of the states” [12, 274).  
The expansion of the principle of non-refoulement occurred primarily 
due to its conflation with non-derogatory human rights articles codified 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), most significant 
of which are Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (freedom from torture). This 
convergence, labelled as the judicialisation of asylum, was brought about by 
                                                          
14 GA Res. 429(V) 
15 GA Res. 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967  
16 Article 33 of the 1951 Convention reads: ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion […]. ’  
17 G.A. Res. 39/46, [annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, 1984]  
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firstly, Strasbourg jurisprudence18, which set a number of radical precedents, 
secondly, the incorporation of the 1951 Convention into domestic laws, and 
thirdly, the emergence of new legal protections against refoulment, 
complementary to the 1951 Convention [4, 12]. Due to these developments 
the principle of non-refoulement, which is the key article of refugee law, had 
evolved into an indirect right of entry in specific circumstances, and assumed 
a status of a customary rule [14, 10]. Within the UK these happenings 
became articulated under the 1998 Human Rights Act, which offers 
additional appeal rights to failed asylum seekers. These phenomena comprise 
the second element of the liberal paradox – the law of inclusion.  
When the two examined elements are juxtaposed against each other, 
an apparent tension emerges: on the one hand, citizen rights are influencing 
restrictive entry policies, and on the other, self-imposed human rights 
obligations are restricting state discretion regarding deportation of non-
citizens. This tension is exacerbated through a growing gap between 
restrictionist policy intent and expansionist immigration reality, as identified 
in Hollifield’s gap hypothesis [5, 570]. Such disparity has exposed the 
friction between the aims and objectives of international and national legal 
systems [14, 10], which ostensibly stem from the existence of the liberal 
paradox. Further, Soysal cites the ECHR as a leading regime, which has 
developed to protect alien rights undermining national sovereignty and 
domestic order of distributing rights [13, 20]. Soysal argues that there is a 
paradox reflected in post-war international migration; where there is a 
process of ‘nationalist’ narrative of polity closure and border restriction at 
the same time as a constant migration flux and the extension of rights to 
aliens.  
                                                          
18 See European Court cases of inter alia, Chahal v UK (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413 and Soering v 
UK (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439  
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The liberal paradox of asylum is said to originate from the two 
normative principles of the global system: national sovereignty and human 
rights. The former seeks to promote specifically-defined citizen rights, while 
the latter espouses a universal application of entitlements. Human rights, by 
definition, move beyond the national frame of reference, however, the 
exercise of these rights is still tied to specific states and their institutions. 
Such features of this legal corpus set the framework for potential normative 
conflict, which, in practice, finds paradoxical expression.  
This paradox  “manifests itself as a de-territorialised expansion of 
rights despite the territorialised closure of polities” [13, 24], or as a 
contradiction between the universalistic rights dimension and the 
particularistic rights dimension of liberal democratic states, which becomes 
activated in the context of asylum [7, 110]. Gibney refers to this as “a gap 
between practical reality of membership-based rights and their universalistic 
mode of justification” [4, 17]. Jacobson argues that what necessitates the 
liberal paradox is the separation of the two components of citizenship: 
identity and rights, in the post-war era. Identity has remained territorially-
bounded and specific, “while rights have become increasingly abstract, and 
defined and legitimated at the trans-national level” [6, 18]. The former 
author cites various post-war developments, which have created an 
institutional and normative shift of citizen rights to a supra-national level and 
thus necessitated the formation of the liberal paradox. Joppke affirms the 
liberal paradox but points to the weakness in recent analyses of human rights 
internationalism, which he claims have drawn a misleading dualism between 
nation states and an external human rights regime: “the protection of human 
rights is a constitutive principle of, not an external imposition on, liberal 
nation states” [7, 110]. The constraints on state discretion over refugee 
issues, he writes, are internal rather than external: “asylum policy is a 
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domestic conflict over competing principles of liberal states; to promote the 
rights of the demos while fulfilling their human rights mandate” 
(1998b:139). Joppke maintains that it is self-limited, rather than globally-
limited sovereignty underpins the acceptance of unwanted immigration by 
liberal states [7, 271].  
Gibney insists that “the tension between the law of inclusion and the 
politics of restriction is best understood as reflecting a deeper conflict 
between liberal and democratic values in a liberal democratic state” [4, 18]. 
The principle of democracy, he writes, mandates that the people have the 
sovereign right to deliberate together to fashion their collective future over 
time. And this means the right to elect representatives of their choice. Such a 
system of democratic citizenship forms structural incentives for political 
leaders to focus on national sentiments. Given the democratisation process of 
asylum policy and the shift of decision power to the demos, the governments 
found their popularity depending on the will of the people, which favoured a 
highly restrictive asylum regime. The principle of electoral democracy, notes 
Gibney, is thus implicated in the rise and maintenance of restrictive asylum 
policy. On the other hand, the judicialisation process of asylum has served to 
check the advance of anti-immigrant strategies, where domestic and 
European tribunals have undermined legal distinctions between citizens and 
aliens on a human rights footing. This development has led to 
institutionalisation of the law of inclusion, which extended British duties 
under article 33 of the 1951 Convention [4, 12-15]. Thus, all three of the 
presented theories accentuate the existence of a contradiction between 
democracy (political sovereignty) and human rights law in the context of 
migration and asylum. 
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